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THE COLLAPSE OF IRELAND’S ECONOMY into its worst recession in modern history
has prompted some professional reflection about the roles and responsibilities of the
country’s financial journalists. Conor Brady, a former editor of the Irish Times, asked
in a commentary article published in his former paper: ‘Was the forming of this crisis
reportable earlier? Were emerging trends apparent? Did they [the news media] do as
good a job as they might have in flagging the approaching storm?’ Brady, editor of
the paper between  and , the period corresponding to the rise of the Celtic
Tiger economy, concluded that criticisms of the systemic problems in the financial
system were articulated by some figures in key positions in Irish society, but were
not reported in the news media ‘in a form that was sufficiently sustained, coherent
and authoritative’. The concerns that did feature in the media were raised primarily
by commentators and academics, but only a ‘very small minority’ of news journalists
(Brady, ).
Brady’s concerns were mirrored internationally. In , an article in the London
Independent headlined ‘Is the media to blame for the credit crisis?’ quoted respected
Financial Times journalist Gillain Tett: ‘There are questions to be answered, such as
why the media wasn’t more of a watchdog, why it didn’t raise questions about the
rise of easy credit and the way money goes round the world’ (Crossley-Holland,
). More recently, Andrew Leckey, a former CNBC host and now president of
the Donald W. Reynolds National Center for Business Journalism at Arizona State
University, observed that:
In a tremendous boom period, they [financial reporters] covered the boom and
people wanted to believe in the boom. They didn’t uncover the lies that were
told to them. Nobody did. But they should be held to a higher responsibility.
(cited in Smith, )
This paper presents an exploratory analysis of Irish financial journalists’ views on
the reporting of the Celtic Tiger economy and its collapse. It situates their opinions
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 The views of journalists were gathered by conducting qualitative, semi-structured interviews with eight cur-
rent or former financial journalists working for news organisations based in Ireland. The reporters were sam-
pled to ensure variability in type of media organisation (print, broadcast, wire service), length of financial
journalism experience, and position in an organisation’s editorial hierarchy. The interviewees were granted
requested anonymity, on the grounds that full attribution would potentially have harmful career consequences,
and reflections against an analysis of the history of Irish financial journalism, a soci-
ological description of the production of financial news, and a contextualisation of
Irish financial reporting within trends and themes of business journalism interna-
tionally. It explores journalists’ self-reported views of how they conceptualise their
professional roles, presents their reflexive critiques of their performance during the
Celtic Tiger years, and outlines their views on whether or not the practice of finan-
cial journalism has changed post-boom.
The Irish experience provides an illustrative case study for the analysis of finan-
cial journalism generally, as the country – an export-led economy that has been
exposed to the winds of globalisation – went, over approximately two decades, from
spectacular growth to near bankruptcy after the crash in the property market and the
near collapse of the Irish banking system.
The Development of Irish Financial Journalism
In terms of the development of financial journalism in Ireland, it is important to note
that the appointment of specialist correspondents did not occur until the s. Up
until then, newspaper reporters remained anonymous, non-specialised and part of a
general newsroom pool. The advent of television, which made news and reporters
more visual, contributed, in part, to the appointment of specialist correspondents
who were required to develop an expertise in a particular field and to cultivate
sources relevant to that field. This gave journalists more autonomy and also made
them household names in that they were now associated with particular strands of
journalism. Up to the mid-s, media coverage of financial matters was relatively
limited and consisted of lists of share prices on the Dublin and London stock
exchanges, the reports of annual general meetings of companies or a prospectus seek-
ing investment in new or existing companies. As for public economic matters – gov-
ernment economic policy, budgets and taxation – there was plenty of coverage – a
reflection of the political nature of such stories.
The economic boom that followed the switch to free trade in the early s
changed the nature of business and financial reporting. As the economy took off,
media institutions began to devote more resources to covering financial matters. In
, the Irish Times appointed Nicholas Leonard as its financial editor. He thus
became the country’s first full-time financial journalist with a brief to produce a daily
‘Business and Finance’ page for the newspaper. The page, which first appeared 
May, , consisted of business news, analysis of company performance, Dublin and
London stock prices, and critical reviews of company annual reports. As Leonard
recalled, company owners and directors did not immediately welcome this new
departure:
It is strange to reflect now that in  it was quite commonplace for sub-
stantial companies, like John Power, the distillers, and Thomas Dockrell, the
builders’ providers, to ban reporters from their annual meetings. Maurice
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as respondents were frequently critiquing their peers and employers, and that the views were their personal
opinions rather than being those of their news organisations. The reporters were overwhelmingly experienced:
six of the reporters had been reporting on financial matters for between five and ten years, one for between one
and five years, and one for more than ten years. The journalists are identified by the letters A to H. Interviews
were conducted in March and April .
Dockrell, the chairman of the latter, used to personally bring me out a glass
of sherry after the meeting and graciously inform me that all resolutions had
been carried without dissent. (Leonard, : )
Nonetheless, the other national dailies followed suit in terms of regular dedicated
space for business news that contained critical analysis. Such was the success of this
new type of journalism that dedicated financial magazines also began to emerge. The
aforementioned Nicholas Leonard was poached from the Irish Times by publisher
Hugh McLaughlin, who launched the republic’s first business magazine, Business and
Finance, in September . Leonard was hired to edit the new -page magazine
that described itself as ‘A weekly survey of trade, finance and the property market’.
In , Hibernia magazine was acquired by John Mulcahy, who re-invented it into
‘a lively, irreverent and often well-informed magazine which specialised in an eclec-
tic but highly marketable mix of political gossip and features, book reviews, and
authoritative business and financial journalism’ (Horgan, : ). Hibernia, which
ceased publication in , was succeeded by The Phoenix, in January ; it too
carried ‘high-grade business and company news stories’ (Horgan, : ).
In the mid-s both the Irish Times and the Irish Independent moved beyond
having a business page to publishing weekly business supplements. In , the
financial media landscape was radically altered with the arrival of the Sunday Busi-
ness Post. Part financed by the French company, Groupe Expansion, which published
economic magazines and newspapers in Europe, the paper’s origins lay with journal-
ists such as Damien Kiberd, former business editor of the Irish Press and the Sunday
Tribune, Frank FitzGibbon, former editor of Irish Business, Aileen O’Toole, former
editor of Business and Finance, and finance reporter James Morrissey (Fallon, ).
The paper, now owned by the Examiner Group, describes itself as ‘Ireland’s Finan-
cial, Political and Economic Newspaper’, has a circulation of approximately ,
and is Ireland’s only dedicated financial newspaper.
It is important to note that the remit of financial journalism also involves cover-
ing the business of media institutions themselves, and indeed the business interests
of media owners. It may also cover the businesses and financial interests of promi-
nent advertisers or regular journalistic sources who might feel that, because they pro-
vide advertising revenue to media institutions or information to journalists, they are
immune to critical analysis. As remembered by Martin FitzGerald, former group
business editor of Independent Newspapers, in the s an attitude existed among
senior financial figures that they ‘owned’ the financial pages. Present at a lunch to
mark the appointment of a new president of the Irish Stock Exchange, to which all
of Dublin’s senior financial editors and journalists were invited, FitzGerald (in
Bourke, : –) later recalled that:
The lunch went well and all the proprieties were observed, until, during the
port, the topic of mutual dependence came up in the conversation. ‘What do
you mean, mutual?’ a rubicund and slightly tipsy broker ventured. ‘The busi-
ness pages are ours. We own them,’ he added. On hearing such blasphemy,
the Dublin financial press went into a collective quiver. What our hosts
seemed to be saying was that we biz hacks shared their preoccupations; we
defended their interests and, maybe, we even did their bidding. So, while we
A POST CELTIC-TIGER ANALYSIS OF IRISH FINANCIAL JOURNALISTS 
finished the port, we insisted to the new president that we were our own men
… Trudging back to the office, however, I admit an icy feeling was coursing
through my veins. Maybe, the chap with the English public school accent was
right. He was implying that we were lazy, dependent and largely uncritical.
More chillingly still, maybe our employers (who shared the same gentlemen’s
clubs with the brokers) were happy with such an arrangement.
The same applied to prominent advertisers. As FitzGerald (Bourke, : –) noted,
the commercial viability of virtually all media organisations depends on the
smoozing of advertisers. The timid business hack finds himself regularly
having to pull or pedal lightly on copy that would otherwise antagonise adver-
tisers.
The same applied to the financial interests of media owners:
behind every organ of media, there is an owner, manager or agent who seeks
to protect an interest. When those interests become wide-ranging and exten-
sive, the scope for comment on these and parallel interests of proprietors
becomes increasingly restricted (Bourke, : –).
Indeed many companies and state institutions remained suspicious of business jour-
nalists. George Lee, RTÉ’s former economic correspondent, began his working life
as an economist with the Central Bank, where he witnessed this suspicion at first
hand:
The prevailing view was that journalists are not all that bright, never under-
stand what they are told, will twist things to get a story, and should never be
trusted. One motto that was repeated again and again in the presence of
younger staff was that, when journalists ask questions about bank matters,
don’t give them any answers and, if you refuse to answer for long enough,
they will go away. (Lee, : –)
Up until , RTÉ was allowed to bring television cameras into Central Bank press
conferences only on the condition that microphones were switched off. According to
Lee, the Bank was fearful that ‘the camera might capture what some executive said
in a moment when he or she was unguarded’. After protests, Lee was allowed to
interview a Bank executive so as to provide sound for his reports and eventually, but
only after RTÉ had threatened to boycott the press conferences, the Bank allowed its
briefings to be filmed with microphones switched on (Lee, : ). As the years
passed, Lee witnessed a more professional attitude towards the media develop within
the business community. This was, as he put it,
a response to the fact that everybody is beginning to realise that all this infor-
mation about economics and budgets is for people. It’s not just for economists.
And it’s not just for tax experts. It’s about our society and it impacts on our
people. (Lee, : )
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Nonetheless, banks and financial institutions have remained wary of the media, have
had their own interests to protect, and can be secretive and duplicitous. But during
the s there were examples of financial journalism that took on power banking
institutions. In  RTÉ exposed the National Irish Bank’s CMI scheme that
allowed customers to apparently move their money to the Isle of Man. In reality the
money remained on deposit in their local NIB branches, in an account identified only
by a number to prevent the Revenue Commissioners from identifying who owned the
money. When a whistleblower brought this information to reporter Charlie Bird’s
attention, he, along with the station’s economic correspondent, George Lee, then cul-
tivated sources within the bank to further their investigation (Lee and Bird, ).
According to Lee, this working together of general reporters and specialist (financial)
reporters was ‘a potent mix [that] produced something that really had an impact’
(Lee, : ). Their report on the affair was broadcast in January . Shortly
afterwards, the Sunday Independent’s Liam Collins (a non-financial journalist) received
information from a whistle-blower and broke the story of how AIB had , bogus
non-resident accounts holding over £ million. This revelation eventually led to the
Dáil’s Public Accounts Committee investigation into the industry-wide practice. In
terms of sources, it seems that financial journalism is similar to political journalism.
On a day-to-day basis financial journalism relies on official and accredited sources for
reaction to and commentary on routine or extraordinary developments, but in terms
of exposing wrongdoing and corruption it relies on whistle-blowers.
Where the National Meets the Global
National and global perspectives have frequently combined in financial journalism, a
specialism that has been described as a prominent example of an emerging global
journalism that reports the complex connections between economic, political and
social issues in different parts of the world. The reporting of the Irish economy has
been a demonstration of what Berglez () described as financial journalism’s rou-
tine linking of nation states and transnational processes, such as the international
flows of money and capital, showing how these national and international factors are
interconnected and interrelated.
The development of Irish financial journalism mirrored the increased prominence
and prestige of business reporting internationally in the past thirty years. Since the
s, the specialism has taken over in the UK from political and foreign news as the
premier serious news area. In this time, the Financial Times replaced the Times as the
most respected UK elite paper (Davis, ). Financial journalism has been viewed
as having several strengths, including high standards of professionalism, because of
the capability and high-level critical expertise that financial journalists bring to their
coverage of events (Parsons, ). In the UK, the mainstream financial press
expanded in the s and the number of specialist financial publications, including
investment magazines and newsletters, grew also, the impetus being the then Con-
servative government’s privatisation programme. The nature of business coverage
changed in this time also, as business had to sell itself as well as its products. Busi-
ness leaders became public figures and some were reported in journalism styles more
traditionally associated with the reporting of politicians and celebrities. Tumber
() noted that what was interesting in this shift in coverage for business was the
way these personality-focused stories were mixed with reports of companies’ finan-
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cial activities and business ethics. Consequently, readers were more familiar with City
culture and scandals inevitably resulted in more prominent media treatment
(Tumber, ).
The current dominant trend of neo-liberal financial economic theory conceptu-
alises the role of journalism extremely narrowly, viewing financial reporters as little
more than conveyor belts of financial data to investors. Most empirical studies from
this perspective have analysed the direct cause-and-effect relationship between a news
announcement and its effect on prices in financial markets (Ederington and Lee,
; Melvin and Xin, ; Janssen, ; for an approach anchored in communi-
cation studies, see Davis, ). Largely, these studies neither examined the content
of news stories nor addressed the professional values of journalists as watchdogs over
elites, who sometimes aimed to recontextualise financial information for non-special-
ist readers by emphasising financial news’ political or social dimensions.
Professional Norms, Values and Roles
The eight journalists interviewed were asked about their perceived readerships and
audiences, whether it was appropriate to describe financial journalism as a form of
elite to elite media communication, their role and work practices (including con-
straints and sources), and whether the story presentation and style differed accord-
ing to where it was to be placed. Even though business journalism has operated
within the processes and constraints of news organisations generally, the field has
been marked by tensions about the roles and responsibilities of financial journalists.
These tensions have been rooted in differing conceptions about the aims and audi-
ences of various publications. Financial media can be generally classified into two
types: those aimed exclusively at highly financially literate audiences and those fea-
turing business and economics as part of the package of general interest newspapers
or broadcast programmes.
The first type includes publications such as the Financial Times and the Wall
Street Journal and the agencies Bloomberg and Reuters. Financial journalists for spe-
cialist publications such as the Financial Times have perceived the paper’s readers to
be educated, informed and relatively financially literate and so have been able to
tailor reports to readers’ interests and demands. Journalists on the business sections
of more mainstream publications have aimed at general, non-specialist, socially-diver-
sified audiences, although their coverage has focused on a portion of their readers as
investors and ‘city people’. Stories have frequently focused on companies, such as
Marks and Spencer or Greencore, known to a wide readership. Journalists on main-
stream publications have also tried to make their stories interesting and accessible,
which helps explain why company stories around the activities, payment and per-
ceived failings of prominent corporate executives occurred regularly. This chimes
with Tumber’s suggestion that the news values in business news reflected the
‘media’s normal preoccupation with the lives of the rich and famous’ (: ).
For economic stories, there has been more coverage in specialist media and less
in more mainstream media, where these reports usually have needed a personal
finance or political angle to increase their news value and consequent chances of pub-
lication. As economic policy has been a highly contested topic, economic reporting
has contained strong elements of political reporting. A further issue for journalists
reporting on economics has been that self-interested parties were sometimes the main
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or only sources of relevant economic data and so controlled access to the data for
economists and journalists (Doyle, ).
News organisations whose financial coverage has been aimed at elite audiences can
be analysed effectively using the critical elite theory framework as outlined by Davis
(: ) where elites were simultaneously the major sources, targets and recipients of
news, and where news was produced and consumed in closed communication networks
in which ‘the mass of consumer-citizens can be no more than ill-informed spectators’.
Davis noted, elsewhere, that business news was heavily source dominated and a
closed circle … has developed between financial PR practitioners (PRPs), City
editors, analysts, institutions and top managements. As a result, journalists
covering financial and business news tend to move in small exclusive circles
consisting almost exclusively of City sources. (Davis, : )
This inter-elite communication was central to sustained political and economic forms
of power in society. Parsons noted:
The financial press – the term we shall use to describe economic and business
reporting as well as strictly financial coverage – is then a unique interpreter,
less of ‘mass opinion’ than of the views and values of a more limited and nar-
rower elite which comprises the readership of the financial pages. (, cited
in Davis, : )
Tumber, by contrast, observed that the field of business journalism was a more open
terrain, containing critical comment on business, although dissent in financial cover-
age may concern only the alternative ways of managing capitalism, with these alter-
native discourses becoming more acceptable in an economic crisis. Moreover,
dissenting voices might be offered because the media itself needs to be seen as dis-
senting (Tumber, ).
Opinions varied very little among the eight Irish journalists in terms of their per-
ceived audience and readership. Journalist A observed that his readership was com-
prised of ‘well informed general readers with an interest in a wide variety of news …
[and] … professionals who need information for their work’. Journalist B noted that
his readership was ‘predominantly ABC readers’ [professionals, employers, managers
and self-employed workers] but also noted that the newspaper tries ‘to make some
stories appeal to wider audiences, especially through use of more light hearted inter-
national features’. Journalist C said the readership were ‘financial specialists’, but also
noted that there was a ‘wider audience’ for financial news. Journalist D said he
believed his audience consisted of ‘those within the financial community and those
outside it with a particular interest’. Journalist E said four audiences existed: ‘com-
panies, regulators, analysts/investment managers and investors’. Similarily, Journal-
ist G said the audience was ‘financial market participants – traders, brokers etc’.
Journalist F noted that the audience for financial news had changed markedly in
recent times:
Traditionally, the audiences for financial journalism were mainly those
involved in running their own businesses or senior executives of large compa-
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nies, though since the collapse of the economy that widened out and most
news consumers will read a financial story.
Likewise, Journalist H said the audience for financial news consisted of ‘a blend of
people … Some are professional investors, others are employees of companies, others
are general readers with economic interests in the country, while some are policy
makers in the area of economics or business generally.’ In terms of whether financial
journalism was concerned primarily with elites – elite sources providing information
that journalists used to construct stories aimed at elite audiences – most of the jour-
nalists dissented from this view, other than Journalist E, F, and G. Journalist E
believed that ‘in general, the business community isn’t interested in communicating
with the ordinary public – they want to get their message to investors, regulators and
their rivals’.
The other five journalists said that financial journalism was centrally concerned
with keeping economic elites in check and ensuring that the wider population was
aware of the impact that financial affairs had on their lives. Journalist A said finan-
cial journalism ‘aims to hold business people and organisations to account. It also
aims to explain events. Take, for example, national accounts and budgets. What hap-
pens in these cases has implications for everyone in the country.’ Journalist B men-
tioned the importance of making people realise the ‘implications of things that have
happened’, while Journalist D noted that:
Like any news specialty (i.e. technology, science, politics, sport), in-depth cov-
erage and analysis of that area will be of particular interest to those with a
high level of interest [and] knowledge in that area and that audience has an
entitlement to that service. That is not to say that when called upon to do so,
a good financial journalist can not or will not tell their story in a style and
manner that makes it relevant to a general audience.
In terms of roles and work practices, almost all of the journalists interviewed saw the
role of the financial journalist as being the same as other reporters who cover a spe-
cialist area or beat. Journalist E believed the specialism’s ‘basic role should be the
same – to keep the audience regularly informed of developments and act as a form
of watchdog for wrongdoing’, while Journalist A said its role was ‘holding business
people and organisations to account and explaining complex events to people who are
not experts in the field’. Journalist H noted that the roles were very different in that
financial journalism is largely:
reporting on private activity that is not automatically open to media scrutiny,
like the business of government … Finance itself is a relationship in the main
between the buyers and sellers of assets; the journalist is an intruder into that
relationship … the financial journalist is not paid to consider the wider social
consequences of commercial decisions, so hence the financial journalist has to
be able to zone in on the strict commercial merits of big decisions.
Some journalists noted that in addition to the usual tensions on all reporting beats –
the constant aims of being competitive, fair, accurate, balanced, and avoiding defama-
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tion in stories – financial journalists faced particular newsgathering constraints.
According to Journalist F, because of the need for regular contact with financial
sources, ‘some journalists are reluctant to be critical of companies because they fear
they will not get information or access in the future’. Journalist E was more forth-
right. He believed that some journalists had become ‘far too close to their sources’:
They viewed them as friends and allies and essentially became advocates for
them. Their approach was justified editorially because many developers and
bankers limited access to such an extent that it became seen to be better to
write soft stories about them than to lose access. Extremely soft stories would
be run to gain access too – indeed, [developer] Sean Fitzpatrick was a partic-
ularly coveted source among some journalists.
A major constraint was access to information. Journalist H noted that ‘company
accounts are by definition historical in nature and commercial information is rou-
tinely denied to financial journalists by a whole plethora of organisations and indi-
viduals’.
Several of the journalists pointed out that they operate under strong legal con-
straints; they are constrained by stock market regulations concerning the public dis-
closure of market-sensitive information that affects share prices. Journalist D stated
that reporters were conscious of the impact of their stories on share prices. He noted
that ‘market behaviour is more often than not influenced by rumours and interpre-
tations of trends so the weight of such consequences is in our minds when reporting
potentially incendiary stories’. Journalist B criticised daily financial journalism for
being ‘almost entirely press release and stock exchange disclosure based’, but Jour-
nalist E observed that the opportunity to undertake investigative financial reporting
– of company performance, for example – is limited because of lack of resources.
Moreover, it emerged that the threat of legal action is particularly acute, since
they are writing frequently about well-funded companies that could afford expensive
litigation. ‘Very often a threat of an injunction is enough to have a story pulled,’
according to Journalist B. Journalist H noted that many legal actions by wealthy indi-
viduals or companies are ‘executed purely to stifle genuine inquiry’.
In terms of sources, it emerged that the business/financial community served as
the major pool of sources for business news. As Journalist E observed:
The routine sources of information are company results, company announce-
ments, regulatory business e.g. consultations, analyst’s reports and company
spokespeople. Company spokespeople often brief for their client, but also
against their competitors. Access to CEOs is quite limited, although they can
be excellent sources.
The journalists also routinely consulted documentary sources, including material filed
with regulatory and statutory bodies, and, as observed by Journalist F, senior jour-
nalists have built up a network of senior financial sources and do not rely on com-
pany spokespeople as frequently. Most of the journalists, however, mentioned that
they are careful to move routinely outside the financial community for sources of
information. Two journalists noted that there has often been considerable pressure
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from public relations professionals to influence the content of financial news. Dis-
turbingly, Journalist F noted, it was ‘well known that some PR companies try to
bully journalists by cutting off access or excluding journalists from briefings’.
In terms of the work they produce, all eight interviewees said there existed dif-
ferences in the treatment of financial stories depending on the intended audience or
readership. They all agreed that the style of writing differed for reports written for
the news rather than the business pages of a newspaper. Journalist A noted that there
existed ‘a greater tendency to avoid technical financial terminology outside the busi-
ness pages’, while Journalist F noted that he would have regularly been told to rid
his articles of ‘jargon and financial terms’. According to Journalist H, such stories
tended to more crudely point out who the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guys were in a particular
development. According to Journalist E, this process of making stories more readable
sometimes caused tension between the news and business desks:
It also brings its own tensions: the news section is generally interested in the
most sensational angle on a story, based on their limited knowledge of the
field, regardless of accuracy. This generally results in a compromise where the
story isn’t as precise as a business story but it’s in the right ballpark. It is
preferable to getting general reporters to write the stories as they lack the
understanding of terminology and financial structures that underpin modern
capitalism.
These tensions were also noted by Journalist F who observed that it was ‘not uncom-
mon for newsdesks to change business copy to make it more ‘punter friendly’’. Sev-
eral of the journalists observed that the process of a story transferring from the
business to the news pages often involved the story referring to why the report was
important to the average citizen. A commonly-used angle was that of consumer or
taxpayer impact. Journalist G highlighted stories about mortgage rates or stories that
involved a cost to the taxpayer (he referred to the bank bailout and NAMA as exam-
ples of such stories) as ‘extreme examples’ of the general newsworthiness of special-
ist financial stories. He also noted that big company losses or stories involving
well-know businessmen (he instanced Sean Quinn or Dermot Desmond as examples)
might also transfer to the general news pages.
Changing Conceptions Post-Boom
The eight journalists interviewed were asked whether financial journalism had been
too uncritical during the economic boom, whether it had changed in light of the
recession, whether financial stories had more of an impact if they contained a polit-
ical dimension and whether they felt they could freely criticise the financial sector.
No consensus emerged when they were asked if financial journalists had been suf-
ficiently critical in their coverage of financial institutions’ practices and government
policy during the Celtic Tiger years. Several journalists believed that an analysis of
the published or broadcast reports would demonstrate that journalists ‘did not shirk’
(Journalist A) their responsibilities, arguing that they performed their role within the
constraints of the specialism, and pointing to the pronouncements of high-profile
commentators and journalists, such as author and columnist David McWilliams and
former RTÉ economics editor, George Lee, as examples of critical journalism. Others
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argued that reporting could have been generally more critical and investigative, espe-
cially in the coverage of banking and property. According to Journalist E, journalists
who covered the banking and property sectors were at times ‘too close to their
sources’ and sometimes became ‘advocates’ for them, sometimes writing ‘soft stories’
for fear of losing access, or in an attempt to gain access, to these elite sources.
Describing financial journalists, Journalist G observed that:
For the most part they were not critical enough and even those that were in pri-
vate conversation didn’t express those views in their stories. There were some
reporters who did criticise policies, but they were in a minority and no matter
how vocal they were, there is an argument that no one wanted to hear it.
Some journalists agreed that critical coverage did not receive the prominence in
newspapers and broadcasts that it warranted. Journalist H observed that ‘business
and economic journalists constantly questioned the sustainability of the Celtic Tiger
economy, but it was not always given proper foregrounding. Criticism of government
policy was rife throughout the period of the boom.’ The same journalist noted ‘there
was too much acceptance’ of what the banks said about their commercial property
lending, but journalists who covered this sector ‘found no outside forces suggesting
the problem was as big as it later became’.
Furthermore, journalists felt they had been constrained in their newsgathering by
the lack of information provided by financial institutions. Discussing the property
boom, Journalist B said there was ‘a dearth of publicly verifiable information on the
rise in indebtedness’. Likewise, Journalist A noted that there
was no requirement on the main players to publicly declare their financial per-
formance and virtually all of them exploited the rules governing companies
with unlimited liability to avoid public scrutiny of their accounts. This was
pointed out at the time, repeatedly.
Nonetheless, the annual reports of banks showed the huge reliance on foreign bor-
rowing and high loan to deposit ratios, which may not have received sufficient cov-
erage. Some journalists identified the tensions involved in reporting on business for
news organisations that were heavily reliant on advertising revenue from certain
organisations. Journalist C noted that:
Much of the mainstream media seems to me to be very conflicted because of
their reliance on real-estate and recruitment advertising. That doesn’t mean
reporters consciously avoid writing bad news stories, but it’s hard to run
against the tide when everyone is getting rich.
Indeed, the importance of property advertising to media organisations was illustrated
in  when the Irish Times purchased for m the property website myhome.ie,
established in  by estate agents Sherry Fitzgerald, the Gunne Group and Dou-
glas Newman Good (RTÉ, ). Significantly, Journalist F believed that journalists
‘were leaned on by their organisations not to talk down the banks [and the] property
market because those organisations have a heavy reliance on property advertising’. In
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addition, according to Journalist B, reporters who were critical were excluded from
receiving exclusive off-the-record information and were often ‘shouted down’ by
politicians or special interests. The comment by former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern in
 in which he wondered why those who were criticising the economy did not
‘commit suicide’ (RTÉ, ) was mentioned in interviews as being symptomatic of
this process of marginalisation. Indeed, commentary articles by economists working
for universities and research institutes – such as UCD economics professor Morgan
Kelly, who predicted the property crash in a  Irish Times article (Kelly, ) –
were viewed to be more critical about the state of the economy than pronouncements
from economists working for banks or stockbrokers.
The volume and tone of coverage was linked also to financial journalists’ expert-
ise, with Journalist F noting that few journalists had business or economics degrees,
and Journalist C adding that the more financially literate journalists were the ones
that were the most critical, as relatively few financial journalists ‘really understand
the numbers and the trends, so there doesn’t tend to be much independent thinking’.
Notably, two of the most high-profile financial journalists and commentators, Lee
and McWilliams, are both economics graduates and worked as economists before
becoming journalists.
Significantly, all eight journalists agreed that the type and tone of financial report-
ing changed when the scale of the global financial crisis and scandals in the Irish
banking sector emerged. Journalist A noted that it was ‘inevitable that reports on an
economic meltdown and corporate malfeasance have their own style and tone. The
tone was no different in past scandals and past crises.’ Journalist D noted that ‘sud-
denly the stakes became far greater. Banks overtook politicians as sources of scandal
and financial news became far more relevant to a general audience.’ Interestingly,
Journalist G noted that while coverage changed this change suited news outlets, as
to such institutions, bad news is good news:
Yes, financial reporters have become much more critical of regulations and
regulators as well as those that are seen to be to blame for the crisis. The tone
of financial journalism has become angrier – in print, but particularly in
broadcast – but this can be partly explained as capturing the mood of the
people. Financial journalism has become much more closely read in the last
two years, in my opinion – partly as people try to understand what happened,
but also because newspapers are pushing financial news more – bad news sells.
Journalist B noted that while business journalists had been critical of certain aspects
of the boom before the crash, ‘the tone turned negative as the scale of incompetence,
at both the regulator and at the banks’ executive level, was exposed’. Journalist C
noted that ‘the economy and business has become the new sport or politics, domi-
nating the front pages. The tone has clearly changed as well.’ Coverage, he believed,
was now ‘far more critical and economists have become the new celebrities’.
Likewise, Journalist F noted that ‘reporters have become much quicker to ques-
tion figures presented by either government or companies and to ask whether the
information has been independently audited as accurate’. Journalist H believed that
coverage has ‘became more critical, more investigative and more sceptical’. Journal-
ists, he believed, have developed ‘a healthy scepticism’ towards the business com-
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munity. However, one journalist – Journalist E – dissented from this new ‘healthy
scepticism’ belief. He noted that ‘most of the top bankers are gone, the regulator is
gone but the financial journalists who so woefully reported their sectors remain in
place. And they still aren’t holding industry to account.’
On whether financial stories had a bigger impact if they contained a strong polit-
ical dimension, seven of the eight journalists believed this to be so. Journalist A
believed that the statement was ‘self-evidently true’, while Journalist B noted that
such stories received more pick-up from other media and generated a stronger feed-
back from the general public. Journalist H noted that ‘editors tend to prefer business
stories that link into the political system and promote those kinds of stories accord-
ingly’. He also noted that ‘stories about the nexus of business and politics are the
favourites of news editors and radio producers’.
This theme was also picked up on by Journalist G who noted that, since people
are more familiar with politics and know how it affects them, it is likely that a politi-
cised story will have a bigger impact. More directly, Journalist D observed that
elected representatives who were also stakeholders in a financial story should ‘be sub-
jected to a higher level of scrutiny than would be applied to an average citizen’. Jour-
nalist C was more cautious. Noting that corporate coverage had a political dimension
‘given the state’s new role in the banking system’, he said that ‘shoehorning a polit-
ical angle into a business story for its own sake is pointless’.
On whether financial journalists can be critical of the financial system, all eight
journalists agreed that they could be, though many questioned the degree to which
critical analysis had been or could be carried out. Journalist A noted that comment
pieces – rather than straight reporting – allowed journalists to be critical, while Jour-
nalist B observed that journalists could be critical ‘by writing about the bonus cul-
ture that fuels short-termism, by challenging broker recommendations, by pointing
out conflicts of interest and by having the courage to take a stand on certain issues’.
Journalist C noted that journalists should be ‘questioning’, but queried what he saw
as the increasingly blurred lines between reporting and commentating. But some of
the journalists also questioned whether financial journalists had been sufficiently crit-
ical during the boom years. According to Journalist E:
The problems that we have seen in Irish financial journalism in recent years
have been due largely to its unquestioning support for the elite consensus.
There have been critical financial journalists but they have largely been mar-
ginalised by their profession. For instance, during the property boom, the
journalists shouldn’t have been just reporting what the developers said, they
should have been asking ‘where’s the demand for all these houses?’ and ‘how
do you propose servicing your debt?’
Journalist F expressed similar sentiments:
It is the most basic duty of any reporter to question individuals, facts and fig-
ures. During the boom years very few reporters asked critical questions for
fear their access would be denied by PR people or [they] didn’t have the
knowledge to ask detailed and probing questions. That has changed and, if
anything, most reporters now distrust everything they are told.
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Journalist D observed a similar theme:
I think the financial system is little different to the political system. There is
little space for in-depth questioning and analysis in a sound bite driven, con-
veyor-belt news environment. But granting specialist journalists greater time
and space to develop knowledge and opinions that they think can contribute
to debate on reform will always keep those in power on their toes.
Journalist G also expressed such sentiments:
Reporters operate within that system and within [or] on the fringes or certain
circles of knowledge. If they are overly critical of those within those circles,
they can lose out on access to that knowledge and therefore they lose stories.
They have to tread a fine line and, generally, I think they tread too cautiously
and don’t criticise enough.
Nonetheless, Journalist H noted that:
The most blistering criticisms of the financial system come from financial
journalists, not general news reporters or general commentators. A slew of
books, written by financial journalists, have been published in Ireland and the
US heavily criticising the financial system.
Discussion
The historical tensions in the development of Irish financial journalism have contin-
ued to manifest themselves in contemporary business reporting. Such tensions mainly
concern journalistic access to sensitive financial information and the degree to which
financial reporters have been ‘captured’ (Davis, : ) by their sources, as argued
by elite-elite communication theory. These professional tensions and conflicts
emerged in the sometimes contradictory interview responses given by the journalists.
They largely disagreed that they were part of elite-elite communication networks, but
generally noted that their sources were largely drawn from the broad financial com-
munity, which in turn comprised a large part of their audience. This tension
appeared to a lesser degree in comments concerning the roles of journalists working
for news organisations whose content was aimed primarily at general readers,
although these journalists did draw as heavily on sources from the financial commu-
nity. Moreover, the responses indicated that the tendency for financial journalists to
operate within elite-elite networks was more pronounced during the Celtic Tiger
years, as the lack of criticism from regulatory, economic or policy sources contributed
to the lack of sustained criticism in news coverage. This tension was intensified by
the fact that the wider financial system in which they have been embedded concep-
tualised their role so narrowly, and has frequently made access to information so dif-
ficult, thereby making systemic criticism more difficult.
Yet the journalists stated that they consistently sought to avoid being enclosed com-
pletely within these networks. They stated that while they covered events and
announcements concerning the financial community, they tried routinely to use non-
specialist financial sources to broaden the scope of their coverage. They also stated that
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they endeavoured to adopt a critical stance in their reports. The extent to which jour-
nalists were part of elite-elite networks depended on the intended audience for that
information, with different audiences for financial information existing often within the
same newspaper. Content on the financial pages was aimed primarily at the financial
community, while business articles published on the news pages were often recontex-
tualised by news editors, to make them more relevant to more general readers.
The self-reported views of Irish financial journalists as outlined here suggests that
such tensions have continued to be inherent in the specialist role itself and were not
something that could be overcome or completely resolved. The tensions were con-
stantly negotiated by reporters in their routine journalistic practice. As the history of
Irish financial journalism demonstrated, the most high-profile examples of critical
financial journalism occurred where the events had a large political dimension, giving
the stories wider impact and allowing the stories to feature a wider range of sources.
A key theme in the analysis was the marginalisation during the Celtic Tiger years of
dissenting voices, which did not receive sustained prominence in coverage. This con-
forms with the observation by economist J.K. Galbraith who, in his A Short History
of Financial Euphoria (), wrote that journalists, and others, who speak out during
a time of collective euphoria about economic growth ‘will be the exception to a very
broad and binding rule’ in which personal interest, public pressure and ‘seemingly
superior financial opinion’ – such as the lax Irish regulatory regime – conspired to
sustain the euphoric belief ( cited in Tambini, ).
This study found, significantly, that once the scale of the interconnected global
economic crises became clear, the tone and style of reporting became dramatically
more critical. Marginalised voices suddenly became mainstream. The economic col-
lapse and the strengthening of the regulatory regime seemed, as in a political crisis,
to empower journalists to be more critical in their attitudes to sources’ credibility and
the intensification of their traditional, sceptical, watchdog role. As this study exam-
ined only journalists’ views, further research would explore the relationship between
journalistic output and the personal attitudes of Irish financial journalists towards dif-
ferent economic systems. A further study might also examine longituditionally media
content, to investigate the degree to which critical coverage, however defined, was
evident, pre- and post-boom. The journalists interviewed for this study agreed over-
whelmingly that there was a new mode of post-Celtic Tiger financial journalism,
marked by increased criticality and scepticism. But an interesting further area of
research could explore whether this stance continues to be maintained when, and if,
the economy recovers.
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